

SOLIDUS

Solidarity in European Societies: Empowerment, Social Justice and Citizenship

Research report on conceptualizing European solidarity

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The purpose of this report is to present a review and synopsis of the main findings from the theoretical reviews carried out under the SOLIDUS project. The report synthesizes the main findings from the literature reviews undertaken for seven concept papers for Work package 1 to Work package 7 inclusively.

The concept papers examined the following dimensions of solidarity:

1. The Spatial Dimension of Solidarity –Deliverable 2.1 (D2.1)
2. Inter and Intra-Group Solidarities: Influencing Factors – Deliverable 3.1 (D3.1)
3. Activating Social Citizenship – Deliverable 4.1 (D4.1)
4. The Third Sector and Solidarity – Deliverable 5.1 (D5.1)
5. Gendering Social Policies for Solidarity – Deliverable 6.1 (D6.1)
6. Combating Social Exclusion to promote Solidarity –Deliverable 7.1 (D7.1)
7. Measuring Solidarity – Deliverable 8.1 (D8.1)

This report also examines other questions regarding solidarity that arise more widely in the research literature but were not the particular focus of any given concept paper.

- It reviews the contributions of different disciplines to the understanding of solidarity and the implications of these for research and policy.
- It also discusses the use of solidarity in political discourse, particularly in the context of the financial and refugee crises in Europe.
- Finally, it addresses the challenges to solidarity arising from both the rise of responsibilised-individualistic approaches to welfare in Europe and the advancement of neoliberal capitalism.

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1 Solidarity: Preliminary Remarks

One of the major challenges to be addressed in the academic analysis of solidarity is that it has multiple meanings and interpretations, both in popular discourse, across cultures, and within and between academic disciplines.

One of the reasons for these differences in interpretations is that solidarity is simultaneously a) an object or goal of politics, b) a set of socio-political practices realizing such politics, and c) a disposition towards practice. As such, it is a complex phenomenon varying in form and context, and in scope and manifestation.

In terms of scope, solidarity can refer to actions that are entirely local and/or group specific, while on other occasions it connotes actions that are global or regional in character. It refers both to individual acts of solidarity and major political movements organised by groups in response to an injustice or oppression (Scholz 2008: 43). At the level of EU governance, it is used to refer to both solidarity within nation states and solidarity relations between nation states.

It is also interpreted and employed both analytically and prescriptively: analytically it is used to distinguish the boundaries of solidarity, to identify who is included or excluded, or to lay down conditions on which solidarity should be offered. At other times it is used prescriptively, especially by politicians who often invoke the principle to encourage solidarity that may be absent or failing.

As one of the distinguishing features of solidarity, at least in its paradigmatic form, is that people are in solidarity *over, for or with respect to something*' (Cureton 2012:697), solidarity can and does have different points of reference. While solidarity is frequently referenced with respect to redistribution in welfare terms (and particularly with the development of the welfare state) (Baldwin 1990), it is also used to refer to the forms of recognition (Kymlicka 2015), including mutual recognition, where 'solidarity as that kind of mutual bonding which integrates a political group, a group which is fighting for something' (Honneth, 2013: 250).

Stjerno (2015: 13) claims that, within the EU, the concept of solidarity is an ideological hybrid that is stretched and strained to meet the demands of different political situations. The ambiguity and lack of clarity on the political scope and purpose of solidarity is reflected in its multiple and diverse interpretations.

2 Solidarity: Theoretical Issues

There are at least four key dimensions to solidarity that can be subjected to analysis, namely the *sources or foundations* that enable it, including beliefs, norms or values; the *boundaries* governing who is or is not included in the solidarity frame; the *goals* it serves politically and culturally; and *how collective interests are balanced against individual interests* (Stjerno 2011: 157). Most academic investigations tend to focus on one of these dimensions to the exclusion of others. The precise character of the focus depends on the given discipline.

2.1. Philosophy

Philosophical explanations of solidarity focus on the sources or foundations of solidarity. The concept is linked to particular normative and ontological assumptions (Kapeller and Wolkstein, 2013: 477). It is generally regarded by philosophers as a disposition of mutual recognition of shared needs and concerns '*that there is something within each of us – our essential humanity – which resonates to the presence of this same thing in other human beings*' (Rorty 1989: 189). Habermas holds a similar view, claiming that solidarity is a feeling for others who share the same form of life, a concern for '*the welfare of consociates who are intimately linked in an intersubjectively shared form of life – and thus also the maintenance of this form of life itself*' (1990: 244). It is regarded as a moral motivation, a 'benevolent motivation towards certain others' (Halldenius 1998: 335), because 'to feel solidarity is to be morally motivated' (ibid: 346).

Although philosophers may agree that solidarity is a normative and ontological motivation, this is not to say that they all agree on the particular normative and ontological assumptions on which it is premised. Some equate it with particular expressions of liberty (Kapeller and Wolkstein, 2013) while others focus on solidarity as a moral and political relationship constituted by positive duties to others, particularly in relation to responding to situations of injustice or oppression (Scholz 2008). Gould (2007) elaborates on this idea, saying that solidarity cannot be demanded nor expected and so therefore it is supererogatory, and not arising from duty. However, this view of solidarity is hard to square with the concept of solidarity as institutionalised practice. Once it is institutionalised in policy, it is clear that solidarity becomes a kind of duty (as in the duty to pay taxes to pay for the welfare of other members of society). Boltanski (2012[1990]), drawing on the work of early philosophers from Aristotle to Kierkegaard to Arendt, claims that solidarity is the political or socialised form of love, and if this is the case, this also implies that it can become a duty. It requires some kind of concrete action, such as granting people the legal right to welfare rather than making it a gift of the rich (Honneth 2013: 256).

Thus, while philosophers regard solidarity as a normative disposition, they differ in defining the character of the normative dispositions and ontological assumptions underpinning it, and in the degree to which they see solidarity as a voluntary action.

2.2. Politics

The analysis of solidarity within political theory focuses frequently on how it operates in the context of political governance, how it increases the level of commitment to a given society and a particular governance regime. Given this, much of the analysis of solidarity within politics focuses on the conditions or boundaries that both enable solidarity or place limits on solidarity commitments and the socio-political purposes it serves.

A central theme in the literature is that solidarity is a 'condition-specific' disposition. (Arnsperger and Varoufakis 2003: 171). That is to say, moral concerns for others are frequently contingent on having a shared sense of identity, shared norms and values, and/or interests (Bayertz, 1999; Gould, 2007). Van Oorschot (2000: 36) claims that the degree to which people feel solidarity with others is based on 'deservingness criteria', namely, the extent to which they are seen to have control or responsibility for their situation, their level of need, their identity (shared and/or respected), their attitude (e.g. gratefulness) and whether there is some reciprocity involved. This suggests that solidarity operates along a continuum of deservedness along which groups are classified as being entitled to solidarity to greater or lesser degrees, by different political actors.

The level of trust that exists between peoples also impacts on the expression of solidarity, with higher levels of trust leading to stronger feelings of solidarity (Cureton 2012). In political terms therefore, solidarity is a disposition to act in the interests of others, a disposition that operates along a continuum from high to very low levels of conditionality.

2.3. Psychology

The conditionality of solidarity is also a feature of empirical research in psychology. It has emphasised the importance of having a sense of shared identity for the expression of solidarity, noting that there is a 'well established link between membership of a social category and commitment to action on behalf of that category' (McGarty and Mavor 2009: 197). It is widely agreed amongst academics from other disciplines as well that solidarity is cultivated and supported by shared identity and shared interests (Bayertz, 1999; Davis and Steinbock, 2011; Gould,

2007). This is an idea that is mirrored in the position that people are in solidarity *over, for or with respect to something*' (Cureton 2012: 697).

However, Tomasello (2008) claims that cooperation and concern for others is not entirely driven by identity-led factors, showing, from his research with young children, how altruistic and collaborative their behaviour can be. He claims that cooperativeness comes naturally to children and is intrinsically motivating, up to the point where reciprocal tendencies and greater discernment begin to show as a result of increased socialisation.

2.4. Sociology

Sociology takes the contingency and conditionality of solidarity as a given. It focuses on the socio-political purposes it serves in terms of social integration and maintaining social order. Within classical sociology, solidarity is defined as being either mechanical, based on sameness and shared beliefs, or organic, arising from interdependency based on differences, with the original expression of this conceptualisation being in Durkheim's *Division of Labour* (1893). From Durkheim's analysis of mechanical and organic solidarity, through Parsons' (1937) examination of the role of cultural integration and institutional interdependence, through to current sociological investigations, the study of solidarity in sociology has focused on how it operates in maintaining political stability and social integration (Stjerno 2004: 25-41).

Following on from the work of Durkheim, Lukes stresses the role a '*conscience collective*' (1973: 152) could play in developing mechanical solidarity, predominantly in the form of religious ethics to which the population could align. In the twenty first century Europe, the likelihood of a conscience collective, inspired by religious ethics alone seems unlikely. Perhaps the formulation of inclusive secular ethics could remedy some societal divisions, as suggested by Elster (2007). However, as noted by Honneth (2013) having solidarity provisions (such as workers' rights) enshrined in legal provisions is also essential to give concrete expression to solidarity feelings and values.

2.5. Forms of Solidarity

What the aforementioned overview of disciplinary disciplines suggests is that solidarity is a normative ideal, although the scope and obligations implied by this ideal vary greatly in understanding across and between disciplines: it can be highly particularistic or strongly universalistic in orientation.

Solidarity is most frequently framed in calculative terms as a type of reciprocal insurance system within, rather than between, nation states (Baldwin 1990; Ciornei and Recchi 2012; de Beer and Koster 2009; Mau and Burkhardt 2009; Stjerno 2004); it is defined as a form of reciprocal giving, a system of mutualised risk and benefits (Bowles and Gintis 2000). In this sense it is particularistic.

But solidarity can also operate as an affective orientation governed by the moral desire to help others in need, regardless of their status or ability to reciprocate; it can be strongly universalistic. However, the calculative and the affective dispositions are not mutually exclusive. The same person can hold these two orientations at the one time, where some groups are deemed deserving while others are not. There is no neat dichotomy between the reciprocal and affective forms of solidarity (Paskov and de Wilde 2012).

As solidarity creates in-groups, it has both exclusionary and inclusionary implications (Putnam 2000): people can be left out of the solidarity network depending on how the boundaries are drawn. Because 'any "we" is necessarily erected against a corresponding "they" (Fraser, 2008: 150), solidarity may be confined to those of the same kinship group, or sharing the same culture, politics and values/beliefs. It may be limited to citizens within a given nation state or regional or it may be universalistic or global in scope, inclusive of anyone who is suffering and in need of solidarity at a given time (Bayertz 1999).

Regardless of what form solidarity takes, it is also clear that if solidarity is to operate in practice, rather than simply as a rhetorical symbol, the principles on which it is based need to have legal standing.

3 SOLIDUS – Concept Notes on Solidarity

Drawing on SOLIDUS research across eight work packages, this paper explores the policy and practice, as well as the intellectual underpinnings, of the concept of solidarity at a European level. The paper provides a summary of the extensive research produced by the work packages and suggests elaborations and particular challenges to policy and practice related to solidarity. Through a synthesis of this current research in the field, SOLIDUS offers new perspectives on the concept and practice of solidarity in Europe.

SOLIDUS has generated an extensive literature and practice review of solidarity in Europe. This work provides an insight into key questions about what solidarity is; who practices solidarity and how solidarity is performed and observed; where and when solidarity emerges and whether it thrives, fails or sustains. The SOLIDUS literature also illustrates the complex interplay between these questions, as definitions of solidarity alter according to who is involved and where or how it is practiced. In this regard, solidarity can be understood as multifaceted in how it is defined, practiced, located and measured. The following sections summarise the main findings from seven key concept papers, integrating their findings and reviews as appropriate. Hopman and Knijn (2017; D3.1) maintain that solidarity has always been a contested subject, in scope as well as in meaning and significance, and can be perceived as behaviour deriving from different and seemingly contradictory motives, including altruism or self-interest, or, it may stem from accepted norms and values of a given society (Ross, 2010; Lepianka, 2012). That is to say, solidarity may be institutionalized in state or regional policy, through strong welfare and recognition codifications and laws, or it may be heavily reliant on voluntary actions of individuals and groups, or it may operate as a combination of all of these processes.

3.1. Solidarity and Spatialization

McDowell, Klinke, Melgar et al. (2015; D2.1) note how solidarity as a form of human sentiment, differs in understanding across disciplines, political regimes and cultures; however, in all cases it has both descriptive and normative dimensions. Within the field of geography, what the discussions and debates around solidarity have tried to do is to ‘foreground key features of solidarity relations that are normatively desirable by reflecting on current existing relationships between peoples and groups’.

Taking a specific focus on the spatial dimension of solidarity, McDowell et al. explore how solidarity research in human geography has been concerned primarily with local articulations of international solidarity rather than with solidarity at a national

scale, and with solidarity shown by non-state actors, rather than with public policy that aims to promote solidarity. While the spatial dimension of solidarity is conceived as a means of ensuring spatial integration, across regions and borders, through strengthening territorial integration and diminishing geographically based disparities, there is 'no integrative definition [of solidarity] because of different theoretical traditions [and the] varying social contexts' within which solidarity is conceptualized.

In addition, Schuermans, Spijkers and Loopmans (2013) observe that a core challenge in the spatialized framing of solidarity is that it has not been a key geographical concept. Geographers have not generally examined the measurable impact of solidarity (although there are some exceptions). However, they have been active in exploring the spatial politics of solidarity and there is a substantial body of work examining transnational labour solidarity and other international social movements (McDowell et al., 2015)

The majority of this geographical work can be divided into two time frames. The first, published between the mid-1990s and the early 2000s, had focused on the relationship between global capital and international labour solidarity. Since the early 2000s geographers have branched out and examined a whole range of processes through the lens of solidarity. These overwhelmingly understand solidarity as a grassroots political struggle, rather than as something that is articulated by states or by economic actors. Whilst different studies may emphasize different practices of solidarity, they are broadly united on one issue, their focus on left-wing, emancipatory-style social movements; there is a tendency to view solidarity as a left-wing concept.

Doreen Massey, a leading thinker in human geography, claims that solidarity 'may involve working to change particular, presently unequal, connections; it may mean challenging the territories of the powerful; or it may mean questioning the whole current form of globalization'. Highlighting the relationship between territory and flow, Massey argues that solidarity expresses the fundamental desire to see a globalised world organised differently. 'Whatever the particular issue', she continues, solidarity campaigns 'raise questions about what alternative architectures might be aimed for' (Massey, 2008: 313). A similar perspective is articulated by David Featherstone (2012). Featherstone (p.5) defines solidarity firstly as 'a transformative relation'. Rather than being about likeness or similarity, he argues, it is about relations between places, activists and social groups. Secondly, he holds, it is 'forged from below', by marginalized and subaltern groups. Thirdly, it is marked by the 'refusal of political activity to stay neatly contained within the nation-state' (ibid). Fourthly, he argues that 'solidarities are constructed through uneven power relations and geographies' and, finally, that solidarity is 'inventive'; it constructs new political relations (p.6). In this regard he is a strong critic of

Durkheim and what Featherstone regards as his 'static' view of solidarity; he regards solidarity as something that can be socially constructed beyond nation states. Both Massey and Featherstone note how space is not a 'flat surface' but a politically constructed set of social relations through which space is organised; space is, by its very nature, full of power and symbolism, a complex web of relations of domination and subordination, of solidarity and cooperation.

3.1.1. Missing Solidarities

McDowell et al. (2015) observe that the tendency of geographers to view solidarity as a left-wing concept has led to a limited understanding of how discourses and practices of solidarity have changed over time, especially in recent years. The way solidarity operates among the powerful, through professional associations, for example, has not been the focus of research by geographers, despite the significance of these forms of solidarity as mechanisms of exclusion. What is also missing from the literature is the systematic analysis of the rise of new-right movements which are anti-immigrant. One important social movement that is not of the left is the so-called *Nouvelle Droite* or 'New Right' that is the intellectual force behind the current Europe-wide protests against the influx of refugees and migrants. This pan-European ideology was set out by the French thinker Alain de Benoist in his *Manifesto for a European Renaissance*, in which he explicitly argues for a new form of solidarity based on local communities rather than the re-distributory mechanism of the welfare state.

'Solidarity must no longer be seen as the result of an anonymous equality (poorly) guaranteed by the Welfare State, but rather as the result of a reciprocity implemented from the bottom up by organic communities taking charge of such matters as insurance and equitable distribution' (de Benoist, 2000[2012]: 44)

There are a whole host of movements and right-wing political parties that want to unite Europe in solidarity against the inclusion of refugees and so-called economic migrants. In October 2010, the English Defence League (EDL) gathered for an 'expression of global solidarity' meeting against Islam that sought to unite similar movements in other parts of the world (EDL, 2015). In Germany, 2014 saw the rise of the Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the Occident (Pegida), like the EDL, a right-wing street movement. Their project is based on an ethnopluralist vision of trans-national solidarity ('a Europe of fatherlands'), but trans-national nonetheless. The success can be measured in border fences and tougher asylum policies.

While not the responsibility of geographers alone, another significant omission in the literature is an analysis of the relationship between anti-solidaristic and pro-

solidaristic campaigns with the media. There is very limited understanding of the role that public service media, mainstream commercial media and social media play in the formation of consciousness about solidarity, and, how these operate both nationally and transnationally. The emergence of the debate about 'Fake News' on social media has drawn attention to the ways in which 'news' creates 'truths' but the role of the media in promoting or undermining solidarity remains significantly under-researched.

3.2. Institutionalized and Individualised Solidarity

Hvinden and Takle (2017) (D4.1) distinguish between two main types of solidarity in terms of the degree of institutionalization. Institutionalized solidarity refers to relatively stable practices expressing inclusive solidarity at the socio-political level. Legal, political, social and organisational structures or commitments may support stable forms of institutionalized solidarity, as do the confidence, trust and predictability that these arrangements enjoy in the eyes of the persons or groups benefiting from them.

Institutional arrangements may be more or less collective, public, private or voluntary, and they may vary in scale or territorial scope. Institutional arrangements are characterised by the fact that they exist for some time, are partly reflecting certain sets of values and norms, and partly contributing to the relative stability of such values and norms by their enactment; they provide some structure and regularity of social relations, at least for a certain time. In other words, institutional solidarity arrangements are dynamic and changing.

The second form of solidarity are individual or collective acts, such as spontaneous and singular acts, including street demonstrations, sit-ins, support actions for refugees, petitions, physical and/or digital campaigns. Almost per definition, such acts of solidarity have shorter durations than institutionalized solidarity, but there may be more of a continuum than a clear-cut difference in their duration. What may commence as street or public protests (a prime example would be the civil rights marches in the US in the 1960s) can mutate into significant institutionalized changes in both law and policy. In other words, successful collective acts of solidarity may set in movement processes toward institutionalization, based on the mobilization of many people supporting a particular demand. To the extent such individual initiatives are successful in terms of number of participants, they may later grow to become national or even trans-national alliances of some duration, with a core of full-time leaders, networks and systems of communication between activists through social media. What then emerges is a hybridized form of individualized-cum-institutionalized solidarity.

There is evidence that this has happened recently in the European context as powerful social movements against austerity and precarity often originated as local acts of mobilization, protest and solidarity (Della Porta, 2015). A prime example of this in Ireland were protests over water charges which began as street protests but led to an agreement in the Dáil (parliament) to have a constitutional referendum prohibiting the privatizing of water (Ogle 2016).

3.3. Macro/ Meso/ and Micro-level Solidarities

Drawing on the work of Bayertz (1990), Hopman and Knijn (2017) observe how solidarity can vary in terms of its frame and scope of reference: it can be narrowly based on family ties or blood relations; or it can be expressed primarily for those with whom one shares a common history or culture; or it can be tied to practicing the civic duties required (paying taxes) under welfare state legislated redistribution arrangements; and/ or it may involve expressed political action where one is defending or promoting common interests. These four uses of solidarity are not mutually exclusive because as Knijn (2004) has shown, solidarity (i.e. human/social solidarity) is related to solidaristic welfare state arrangements (civic solidarity) and may even strengthen it.

3.4. Inter-Group and Intra-Group Solidarities: Identity and related Issues

Hopman and Knijn (2017) emphasise the complex ways in which solidarity is characterized by both a political-economic structure and a social-psychological structure. Correlatively, they identify the strong links between psychological, cultural, institutional and socioeconomic factors influencing such solidarities.

Their paper gives particular attention to the social psychological dimensions of solidarity. Drawing on the work of Hollinger (2006), they point out that solidarity can be described as an “experience of willed affiliation” and, as such, solidarity differs from a concept like community. While solidarity asks for a greater degree of conscious commitment and is often based on a shared interest (e.g. tackling poverty or some injustice), it can also be based a shared trait (e.g., being a woman) (Hollinger, 2006: 24).

The importance of shared traits for solidarity depends on the context. Hopman and Knijn note that, while shared traits, such as a religious identity, might be important to someone personally, maybe even more than his/her ethnic identity, her or his religious differences may not be a salient marker in defining the social identity. Instead, ethnic identity might be a more salient factor regarding social identity and consequently be more important in solidaristic practices.

Hopman and Knijn (2017; D 3.1) also note that while one can distinguish analytically between inter-group and intra-group solidarity (intra-group solidarity is most likely when there is a perceived external enemy or threat, while inter- group solidarity occurs when there is a relevant subject population whose concerns need to be voiced (Simon & Klandermans, 2001)) nevertheless, different forms of solidarity overlap, so when collective politically-driven solidarity diminishes individual forms of solidarity are also reduced.

3.4.1. Conditionality and Solidarity

Regardless of what form it takes, or whether it is expressed within or between groups, Van Oorschot (2000) notes how solidarity is often expressed on conditional terms, on degrees of deservedness. Willingness to show solidarity is especially dependent on whether or not those receiving and/or requesting solidarity are seen to be in control of their situation (the least deserving are those seen to have most control). Having a shared identity with those seeking solidarity (being part of an in-group) is also an important criterion of deservedness, as is the ability to express reciprocity, or having shown reciprocity in earlier times. Those whose needs are most imminent and urgent are also seen to be more deserving, as are those who express gratitude or are compliant in their supplications.

Hopman and Knijn attribute particular significance to the shared identity criterion, arguing that it has been a central issue in the analysis of solidarity in action, particularly research based in Social Identity Theory and Self-Categorization Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 2004; Turner & Reynolds, 2012). However, while a social identity can bind people together (intragroup solidarity) and offers options for intergroup bonding, it can lead to exclusion of those not in the group at the same time (Putnam, 2007). In Bayertz' words: "one is solidary with those to whom one is close due to some common ground: a shared history, shared feelings, convictions or interests. In this sense, 'a particularistic – maybe even exclusive – dimension is inherent in the general use of the term solidarity' (Bayertz, 1999:8).

The barriers and drivers of solidarity also vary in terms of the type of welfare regimes in operation and the values of a given society. Hopman and Knijn point to how social and economic developments since the 1980s have resulted in a situation in which solidarity is no longer seen as a moral principle, but rather an administrative norm or practice contingent on an individualistic achievement-oriented ethic (Schuyt, 1998: 301). This claim is verified by Frericks' (2010, 2014) research which shows how self-responsibilisation has become a powerful norm in relation to the operationalisation of the welfare state exemplified in the proliferation and institutionalisation of forms of 'active' and 'responsible' citizenship and the privatisation of welfare.

3.5. Social Citizenship and Solidarity

In their paper on Activating Social Citizenship, Hvinden and Takle (2017) (D4.1) review relevant scholarly, especially social policy, research that has been conducted on the concept of social citizenship, from Marshalls' conceptualization of social citizenship (1965) as *status* associated with a given set of social rights and obligations, to social citizenship as a *practice*, requiring active agency and enabled capacity to have a sustained reality (Arendt, 1998, Nussbaum, 2000; Sen, 1992). They define social citizenship-as-practice as an accomplishment enhancing solidarity: people are social citizens and are enabled to promote solidarity to the extent that they exercise active agency. Drawing on the work of Andersen and Halvorsen, they claim that, while non-stigmatising generous social rights enable full citizenship...being a full and equal citizen is, basically, a question of practices: living a decent life in accordance with the prevailing standards in society, being able to act autonomously, being able to participate in social and political life in the broadest sense, and having 'civic' orientations to the political community and to one's fellow citizens" (Andersen & Halvorsen, 2002, pp. 12-13).

Hvinden and Takle identify three distinct dimensions to this type of active social citizenship (Hvinden & Johansson, 2007). A solidaristic society is deemed to be one in European countries have varied considerably however in how these dimensions of social citizenship have been implemented. Some countries have placed greater emphasis on the public (re)distribution of resources and collectivization of risk protection: they offer considerably more public solidarity and *security against risk* in their welfare and employment codes. Other countries have prioritised the *autonomy* of individuals or families in managing welfare, health and other social responsibilities as exemplified in the use of private insurance contracts over universal welfare provisions. Finally, yet importantly, citizens' opportunities for exerting *influence* on public affairs, at local, regional or national levels vary considerably across European states.

While the form of active social citizenship that Hvinden and Takle conceptualise involving security, autonomy and influence, does equate with solidarity in a very meaningful sense, active citizenship has, as they admit in their paper, been increasingly understood as a requirement that citizens take *more individual responsibility* for their well-being and risk-protection. Since the late 1970s, persistent welfare-state retrenchment, and a decline in redistributive solidarity is a salient European development (Korpi 2003). The libertarian rather than the social-democratic liberal view of welfare is gaining pre-eminence. Social protections are increasingly marketised and outsourced, with an attendant lack of protection for those who are most vulnerable in a pay-as-you-go system (Frericks 2011). While pension reforms are part of the efforts to make pension arrangements more

sustainable, they tend to shift effectively the risks related to economic security in old age from the state to the individual (Hinrichs, 2007).

The concept of active social citizenship is therefore a contested one. While many applaud the ideals of self-determination, autonomy and influence for all citizens, particularly for those previously denied such rights, the term *active citizenship* can also imply adherence to a given pre-coded script of conduct as to how one is to behave to fulfil its requirements (Isin, 2013, pp. 41-42). The criticism is especially salient when it is applied to work activation, where *active citizenship* can merely operate as a prescriptive code that makes welfare entitlements contingent on compliance to norms and regulations over which people exercise neither autonomy nor influence, and which do not guarantee security.

A further challenge for the concept, as it exists operationally and in political practice, is that it is increasingly associated in the public mind with the growing marketisation of the state welfare system (Crouch et al., 2001). The consumerization of welfare whereby state services are offered on market terms is growing apace, especially in Anglophone countries but also outside of these (Mau, 2015). There is considerable evidence that the concept of the citizen-with-rights is being gradually replaced with the concept of citizen-as-consumer (Aberbach and Christiansen, 2005; Clarke et al. 2007). The implication of this change is that one only has rights vis-à-vis the state if one can acquire these on market terms.

3.6. Channelling Solidarity – the Role of the Third Sector

Eschweiler and Hulgård (2017; D 5. 1) investigate how the third sector acts as a conduit for solidarity actions, social innovations and initiatives that can direct social policy. They focus their analysis on the co-production of welfare services, and on the ways civil society and related groups and social movement gain voice in public discourse to influence public policy practices; they also examine the barriers and drivers that operate for channelling grassroots initiatives and ideas into political and policy practice.

Eschweiler and Hulgård's paper (2017; D 5. 1) provides a detailed overview of the concepts and literature underpinning the analysis of the third sector, and relatedly on social innovation and co-production. They also present a comprehensive review of the intellectual foundations of key concepts relating to solidarity, including civil society, social movements, the third sector, and the social economy, given the strong association between these key concepts. In addition, they explore on the significance of civil society for enhancing social equality and liberty, and solidarity, and how the plurality of views and creativity inherent in civil society, combined with its

autonomy, enable it to be a force in democratizing the structures of the state (Keane, 1993, 1998).

One of the challenges Eschweiler and Hulgård faced in undertaking this overview is that there is little agreement as to where the boundaries lie for the third sector. Notwithstanding this, they claim it generally includes all voluntary, non-profit and nongovernmental organisations (NGOs), civil society bodies, the social economy, solidarity or advocacy organisations, cooperatives, mutual societies, and foundations, and, more recently, social enterprises.

Another challenge in analysing the relationship between the third sector and solidarity practices is that which is defined as the 'third sector' varies across Europe depending on cultural, political and intellectual traditions. In some countries, particularly Ireland and the UK, the third sector is traditionally equated with organisations that have charitable status and purposes (many originating within, or operating under within rubric of specific religious traditions); in Northern Europe, it typically refers to private institutions that are doing work on a non-profit basis; in the Netherlands it also refers to non-profit associations providing services, but also to advocacy groups, and social enterprises. In France, Belgium and Southern Europe, the term 'third sector' is not widely used; instead, the term *social economy* is deployed to refer to groups such as cooperatives and mutual societies. Despite their differences, all of these manifestations of the third sector share certain common attributes: they are all institutionally separate from government, they share a high degree of self-governance, and they have a social mission that is pursued on a voluntary basis.

Promoting solidarity through inputs from the third sector has a number of merits, not least the fact that the democratic and participatory character of third sector organisations enables social services to be delivered or co-designed by-citizens-for citizens thereby ensuring decisions are made closer to the needs of real people and thus more innovative. In theory, social innovation and co-creation is not about replacing the responsibility of the state sector with the voluntary and community sector; it is about concerted action between multiple sectors and actors and reflects both a New Public Governance (NPG) approach (Osborne, 2010) and a solidarity economy (SE) approach (Laville, 2010) to the production of public services and social policy. The goal is to integrate marginalized and socially excluded people through operating several economic and political principles that build a bridge between the public welfare state and a strong civil society.

However, Hulgård claims that the concept of the social economy has gained popularity among policy makers as it both facilitates and emblemizes the gradual transition of European (and other) welfare states from institutional and redistributive orientations in welfare policies towards enabling and work-oriented policies; social responsibility shifts from being a public concern to an individual and

private concern (Hulgård 2010, Hulgård & Andersen, 2012). The ways in which responsibility for welfare is being personalized and individualised is, as noted above, a general trend in areas such as pensions, even in strong welfare states in the Nordic countries, and in Germany (Hinrichs, 2007), and more generally throughout Europe in terms of social security (Frericks, 2010, 2011, 2014).

While the third sector is traditionally seen as the sphere of political advocacy and service provision, today it is defined increasingly in economic terms as it is expected to take on functions, traditionally located within welfare state responsibility, through public- private partnerships and service contracts or as a separate social economy that substitutes state provision. The challenge that this presents is that it places an onus on non-governmental organisations to deliver services, especially where they lack capacity or skill in the co-production and management field. Much of staff time and effort has to be devoted not only to securing funding for the service (including getting co-funding) but also into monitoring and recording achievements and meeting the technical and accountability demands of both the state agencies and government departments (Harvey, 2014).

The transfer of social security and welfare services to third sector organisations also raises important issues about the ability of these to be critical advocates for those who are marginalised while they are cooperating with statutory agencies that may have power over their organisational futures (Harvey 2013). A research report commissioned by third sector (known as the community voluntary and sector in Ireland) in 2014 provides compelling evidence on the seriousness of this issue. While the State supports a range of national voluntary organisations in their advocacy work, funding, welcoming and respecting their contribution, the overall picture was one of increasing state control and regulation of third sector advocacy work in particular. This trend is not confined to any one country or sector of Irish society (Lynch, Grummell and Devine 2012); moreover, the rise of the managerial state is an international development under neoliberalism (Clarke and Newman 1997).

In there was an emerging narrative that a strategic turn took place in the relationship between the state on the one hand and the voluntary and community sector on the other after publication of the government White Paper *Supporting Voluntary Activity* (2000). This took the form of the cancellation of the policy unit (2002), leading to the closure of the Community Development Programme (2010) and the alignment process (2013-4); and, in parallel, the introduction of the services paradigm and the SLA § 2.8 no-advocacy clause¹. Those who tried to open up a debate about the limits and permissions of advocacy found it a futile experience. The research brought into question the capability of the civil and public service to manage advocacy. In the experience of the interviewees, most civil or public servants were neither trained nor equipped to work with voluntary or community

organisations nor the issues associated with them (Harvey, the Advocacy Initiative, 2014: 12).

While the case of Ireland is different to many other European countries (given that it has traditionally had greater reliance on third sector organisations to provide many health, welfare and education services than other mainland European countries), the trend towards privatizing social services (be it through public-private partnerships and/or co- production (such as service level agreements) is similar in both purpose and intent in other European countries (Korpi 2003). Civil society is being assigned a delivery role but it often lacks the power and capacity to design the services or develop advocacy on its own terms.

Gingrich & Häusermann (2015) claim that what is emerging is a new ‘post-industrial welfare support coalition’ that is increasingly rooted within the middle classes to the detriment of more marginalised groups: state interventions are moving away from traditional social policies, such as compensating for income loss and other transfers, and towards backing for ‘labour activation’ policies and ‘human capital investment’ programmes. This perspective is also endorsed by Steffan Mau (2015): he suggests that it is the majoritarian-based European middle classes that have assented to a shift from classical social democratic to neoliberal market-based norms in welfare provision, and he claims this is to the detriment of solidaristic, welfare-based modes of social cohesion. This refers to the Service Level Agreement (SLA) clause that prohibits the use of funding advocacy or persuasion in matters of policy or practice.

3.7. Combatting Social Exclusion: Enabling Solidarity

Munté and Melgar’s (D7.1) paper presents an outline framework for incorporating socially vulnerable groups in the design, planning, implementation and evaluation of solidarity-related policies. Their principal message is that, if currently excluded groups are to have their needs incorporated successfully in policy initiatives, something that is essential for their success, then it is vital that they are encouraged, resourced and fully supported to engage in all phases of solidarity policy-making.

They review the literature to show how the involvement of vulnerable groups on the design and evaluation of the policies has worked in a range of contexts within and outside of Europe. Munté and Melgar (D7.1) outline in particular how the Design of the “Plan Integral del Poble Gitano” [Integral Plan of Roma] elaborated by the Autonomous Government of Catalonia worked successfully in that region. This plan involved the Roma in the design, implementation and evaluation of the policies that affected them. The egalitarian and respectful way in which the policy was implemented led to its success.

Because institutions of representative democracy and bureaucratic administration are not designed to engage with local issues and concerns (not least due to the difference in scale between the local and the national) they cannot easily practice forms of democratic engagement that involve citizens working for the consensus through dialogue, (Fung & Wright, 2003). Drawing on the work of Fung and Wright, Munté and Melgar (D7.1), profile a number of institutional structures that guarantee the development of democratic strategies when promoting social justice and solidarity while respecting individual freedom. These include neighbourhood governance councils in Chicago and participatory budgeting structures in Porto Alegre in Brazil.

Within the European context, there are also expressions of direct and participatory democracy (Best, Augustyn, & Lambermont, 2011). One of Best et al.'s recommendations is that 'political parties [should] adopt European positions and engage with citizens at the grassroots' (Best et al., 2011: 102). Best et al. claim that this strategy works for deepening democracy and for consolidating a sense of European identity, and that it is also the best way to address citizens' needs.

Munté and Melgar claim that deliberative democracy is necessary for people to reconnect with political institutions so that they can have a meaningful dialogue with those in politics about their democratic concerns; trust in politics and its institutions is essential for people to feel solidarity with others.

They also note how essential it is for politicians to engage in deliberate democracy in order to promote solidarity with minority groups, especially in countries where relations between majorities and minorities are governed by mutual prejudices and distrust. Quoting Kymlicka (2010, p. 107) they observe that minority groups should move from being defined in terms of the 'security box' to the 'democratic politics box'.

As there are many groups that are *de facto* if not *de jure* excluded from political engagement in any meaningful deliberative or participatory democratic sense, including many people with disabilities (especially those with intellectual disabilities), young people (especially those neither in employment nor education), the unemployed, and those who are homeless, there is a need to establish respectful and egalitarian methods of communication and engagement with them politically if they are to have their voices heard and respected. Egdell & Graham (2016) give an example of how the Capabilities Approach was employed to identify the needs of young jobseekers in the UK. One of the main results of this research is that the young unemployed perceived the main barriers to their employment as being structural constraints. However, employment and activation policies are focused more on the individual and their personal situations; they take insufficient account of the structural barriers identified by the young people (Egdell & Graham, 2016).

The kind of deliberative democracy practices and participatory dialogues that are necessary to engage with those who are currently excluded from mainstream politics also require education and investment so that people have the capacity to represent themselves. If there is to be the healthy political environment, based on the kind of communicative acts proposed by Habermas, based on validity claims between the speakers involved rather the power of their voice, then those who speak from below need to be empowered to be heard, not just once but over time.

3.8. Gendering Social Policies to Promote Solidarity

Flecha and Melgar (2017; D6.1) examine the issue of gender and why it matters for solidarity in their paper. Focusing on how the economic crisis has impacted on women across Europe they provide a detailed analysis of European-wide initiatives and acts of solidarity that have been contributing to overcoming gender inequalities, as well as documenting the persistence of gender-related injustices, including injustices experienced by LGBTI groups. Their analysis addresses the five policy areas within the SOLIDUS project: employment, health, education, housing and civic engagement.

What their paper shows is that the gender differentials in employment, health, education, housing and civil engagement, operate to a large degree at the advantage of men, although there are important differences in levels of inequality between women and men within European countries in each of those areas, and between different classes and groups of women within each nation state. Moreover, the way the financial crisis impacted differently on women and men, varied across countries and sectors of employment.

Given the salience of employment for ensuring parity of participation in other areas of life, some of the main issues raised in the paper are outlined below.

Flecha and Melgar's paper (2017; D6.1) documents how women's employment rate had been growing in Europe up to the financial crisis, but decreased by 0.5% between 2008 and 2009, while growing slightly towards the end of the crisis, from 58.4% in 2011 to 60.4% in 2015 (Eurostat, 2015). Across the EU, however, the gender employment gap still remained high at 10.5% in 2014, and to the advantage of men (Eurostat, 2014).

Activity rates in the EU-28 are also consistently higher for men than for women: the male activity rate stood at 78.5% in 2016, while the rate for women was 67.3% (Eurostat, 2016a). Parenthood is one of the main factors underlying the gender gap in activity rates. Because women are more often involved in childcare, parenthood is more likely to have an impact on their activity rates than on those for men,

especially when care services are lacking or are too expensive as is the case in many European states.

Flecha and Melgar (2017 D6.1) also observe that the financial crisis also had a particularly adverse impact on women belonging to vulnerable groups such as young people, cultural minorities, migrants, women with disabilities and/or women without academic degrees. The female youth unemployment rate increased, for example, from 18.8% in 2009 to 20.8 % in 2011. In 2015, almost one quarter (23,0 %) of young women (aged 20–34) in the EU-28 were neither in employment, education nor training (NEETs), while the corresponding for young men was 14.9 % (EUROSTAT, 2016b). Across Europe as a whole, the younger the worker is, the higher the employment losses experienced during the crisis (Bettio et al., 2012). With regard to LGBTI people, the 2015 Eurobarometer on Discrimination survey (European Commission, 2015) shows considerable disparities between EU countries in terms of social acceptance of LGBTI people at the workplace. What all groups experienced in common however, was deterioration in their working conditions and the security of their employments.

However, as women were already more likely to earn less than men, and to be more reliant on part-time and/or temporary work than men prior to the crisis, women in these positions were especially adversely affected by the crisis (European Parliament 2013).

3.8.1. Health

Women's life expectancy is higher than that of men throughout Europe, and is an indicator of their general good health. Flecha and Melgar (2017 D6.1) present data from the European Commission and the WHO showing that life expectancy improved for women in all countries between 2000 and 2015 and is higher than for men in all 28 Member States. This average, however, hides considerable variation across the Member States according to the last data provided by WHO (2015); life expectancy for women ranges from a high of 85.5 years in Spain to a low of 78 years in Bulgaria.

A whole variety of factors impact on women's and men's health, among the most important of which is their socioeconomic and social class status (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2006, 2008): moreover, the higher the level of economic inequality in a given society, the greater the health inequalities within it for the whole population (Wilkinson and Pickett (2009).

Although women (and men) from the higher income groups have better health and higher life expectancy than those from lower income groups, it is women of all ages and classes that disproportionately undertake informal unpaid care for children and

dependent adults. Accessible and affordable formal care alternatives are scarce in many European countries and may not only be inaccessible and unaffordable but also of low quality. These factors place pressure on women, through cultural mores and family norms, to provide intergenerational support. The so-called sandwich generation is created for mothers and grandmothers, in which the combined effect of increased longevity and delayed fertility means women provide care to younger and older generations in the family.

The most striking imbalance of power between women and men in every country, and among the whole population, is in the level of violence against women. The World Health Organisation (WHO 2015), estimates that a quarter of women in Europe have experienced violence from an intimate partner at least once in their life. Risk factors include social isolation, harmful alcohol use, being a victim of child maltreatment and unfavourable societal gender and violence norms and attitudes. Women's education, membership of the formal workforce, property ownership rights for women and strong legal frameworks against violence are protective factors. As violence has serious and long-term effects on women's physical and mental health through direct and indirect pathways, leading to physical and psychological trauma, stress, fear and a host of health and well-being problems, it remains a serious health issue for women.

3.8.2. Housing

The report on the State of Housing in the EU 2015 indicates that after several years of austerity and economic crises, and a supposed recovery, the overall state of housing in the EU still remains unstable (Pittini, Ghekière, Dijol, Kiss, 2015). There were more people without a home in Europe in 2015 than six years previously and, there are not enough available affordable homes in most European countries to meet the increasing demand (Pittini et al., 2015).

Homelessness is on the rise across the continent. Flecha and Melgar report that the situation in the most vulnerable groups keeps getting worse, social exclusion from safe affordable housing is becoming more intense. Several studies have identified the gendered nature of women's homeless pathways: women more often than men, are 'invisibly' homeless' because they seek temporary solutions such as living with family, friends, "convenience partners" or casual acquaintances. Housing insecurity is also a big issue for lone parents, most of whom are women, and many of whom are not earning sufficient income to buy a home of their own.

Although the lack of affordable housing is now the major cause of homelessness, Europe is building fewer houses since the beginning of the recession, regardless of the sector involved (private, public, cooperative, voluntary), with the sole exception

of Germany. Rising construction costs make it even more difficult for most countries to keep up with the demand. For example, in Sweden 436.000 homes are needed until 2020 while the government's national objective is 250.000: 245.000 new homes are needed in the UK every year and not even half of them are being built (Pittini, Ghekière, Dijol, Kiss, 2015).

3.8.3. Education

More women than men in Europe now graduate from third-level education. However, women are still less likely to enter and graduate from more advanced levels of tertiary education, such as doctoral or equivalent programmes (OECD, 2016). The gender division in education is also reflected in students' field of study. Women remain under-represented in science and engineering, and over-represented in others, such as education and health. In 2014 there were, on average, three times more men than women who graduated with a degree in engineering and four times more women than men who graduated with a degree in the field of education (OECD, 2016). Gender imbalance in fields of study are mirrored in the labour market – and ultimately in earnings. Graduates in the field of engineering, for example, earn about 10% more than other tertiary-educated adults, on average, while graduates from teacher training and education science (where women are heavily concentrated) earn about 15% less (OECD, 2016). While data show that girls and boys perform equally in schools and at universities in the areas of maths and science (OECD, 2016) women are heavily underrepresented in senior and top positions in the world of work

What is significant about women's educational advantage is that it does not translate into a labour market advantage, or indeed parity of status within a given sector of employment. While the factors that explain this are complex, there is no doubt that gendered expectations of women and men within employment, and the moral imperative on women to be the primary carers in families, even when they are employed, disables them from competing for senior posts on equal terms with men.

3.8.4. Civic Society

Flecha and Melgar's (2017; D6.1) paper highlights some differences in civil society engagement. While some of these are differentiated by gender, throughout Europe, it is those who are older and better educated who are most likely to vote, for example, regardless of gender.

Volunteering is a recognised expression of civic engagement but it is strongly influenced by the history, politics and culture of each community and EU country. Whilst certain EU Member States have longstanding traditions in volunteering and well developed voluntary sectors (such as Ireland, the Netherlands, and the UK), in others the voluntary sector is still emerging or less well developed (in Bulgaria, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, and Romania). Notwithstanding the differences between countries, various reports estimate that between 100 and 150 million of Europeans aged between 15-65 years are engaged in voluntary activities (Mathou, 2010).

The gender balance of volunteers varies considerably across European countries. In general however, most countries tend to have either a greater number of male volunteers than female (11 countries) or an equal participation between men and women (nine countries). One of the factors that contributes to these differentials is the fact that men are disproportionately involved in sport, and in volunteering in sport (ibid).

As volunteering takes time and resources, it is clear that poorer women are less likely to have these as only 30 % of women with only primary education are volunteers, compared to 60% of women with university degrees (Mathou, 2010). Also, as women are Europe's informal primary carers of children and vulnerable adults, this also leaves these women very little time for voluntary or civic activities.

Flecha and Melgar report that volunteering is high among the LGBTI community; it is centred on working on LGTB identities and their recognition, and working on issues such as AIDS (Ramirez-Valles, et al. 2014).

Flecha and Melgar's paper also lists a range of initiatives and programmes developed by the European Union and other European bodies to promote greater equality between women and men, and between heterosexual people and the LGBTI communities. The most recent gender initiative by the European Commission is the Strategic Engagement for Gender Equality 2016-2019 (European Commission, 2016). The Commission decided to maintain the five priorities areas defined in the previous strategy.

The European Commission has also recently adopted a list of actions in order to advance LGBTI equality (European Commission, 2015). These policies areas focus on non-discrimination, education, employment, health, free movement, asylum, hate speech/hate crime, enlargement and foreign policy. To measure the inclusion of

gender as a transversal axis in the analysis of the practices and policies associated with solidarity, they recommend a method, which includes a focus on the inclusion of voices (particularly vulnerable women and LGBTI groups) in the formation of European policies for social inclusion.

What is clear from Flecha and Melgar's review is that while women's improving employment, health and education does enable many to be engaged in solidarity actions in civil society, they are constrained by gendered expectations, and by the strong demands that informal unpaid care work places on them regardless of their education or socioeconomic status.

They note that increasing female labour-market participation and the equal economic independence of women and men, and reducing the gender pay, earnings and pension gaps, would help fight poverty among women. Promoting equality between women and men in decision-making, combating gender-based violence and protecting and supporting victims also promote gender equality.

3.9. Measuring solidarity

de Botton, Joanpere, Melgar and Angeles. (2017; D8.1) review a range of different approaches, indicators and methods for measuring solidarity. The aim of their paper is to identify existing measures that would help build effective indicators of the social impact of solidarity. They note however that the evaluation of solidarity projects is at a very initial stage in Europe.

They identify several indicators that measure solidarity including citizen surveys and studies that analyse the feelings, motives and social values that drive European citizens to participate in solidarity actions (Halman, 2001; Kankaras & Moors, 2009; Paskov, 2016; Paskov & Dewilde, 2012). At an international level, they claim that one of the main studies on the analysis of social transformations was carried out by the *Agence Française de Développement* (Aberlen, Bedecarrats, & Boisteau, 2016), a public financial institution implementing the French Government's policies to combat poverty and promote sustainable development. In the report *Analysis, Monitoring, and Evaluation of Contributions to Social Change* several authors reflect on the criteria for measuring and evaluating social changes, drawing on different dimensions such as economy, gender or cooperation, among others. De Botton et al. suggest that some of the criteria mentioned in the report could be adapted to the analysis of solidarity including criteria such as measuring the impact of cooperation on social change.

However, they point out that most analyses focus on solidarity from a personal and subjective perspective; no studies to date show how to evaluate the social impact of solidarity actions generated by organisations and institutions (although Reyes 2005

has done work on measuring the impact of the social economy). Neither is there an agreed set of criteria that allow the generation of standard indicators to evaluate the social improvements produced by actions based on solidarity.

Moreover, the existing criteria for evaluating the social impact of solidarity vary according to the way in which solidarity is defined and practiced. They observe how the impact of solidarity is discussed across a range of scientific disciplines; however, the literature shows that there are diverse evaluation methods, and these are often tied to the discipline in which the evaluation takes place. Several researchers evaluate using surveys, such as the Human Development Index (HDI), the European Value Survey (EVS) and World Value Survey, the Happy Planet Index, or the Gallup Sharecare Well-Being Index as measures of different forms of solidarity.

Overall de Botton et al (2017: D8.1) conclude that there is a need to evaluate solidarity social impacts across different policy areas, particularly in health, economy, employment and social inclusion. They also identify the need to devise solidarity indicators at *macro*, *meso* and *micro* levels and the need to measure the social impact of solidarity initiatives on the basis of the demands and needs of society. These involve qualitative and quantitative measures. They claim that it is possible to utilize the selected indicators of the different reviewed indexes as a starting point for developing solidarity indicators, including the UN's HDI Index, the European Values Survey and the Well-Being index although none of these are specifically designed to analyse solidarity impact per se. They hold that any index or evaluation measures of solidarity impact should have regard for the five assessment criteria for social impact developed by SIOR (Social Impact Open Repository), which includes:

- Connection to United Nations Sustainable Development Goals, EU2020 target or other similar official social targets
- Has achieved more than 30% of improvement
- Transferability: at least implemented in 2 different contexts
- Social impact published on scientific journals with recognized impact (at least 1 article), governmental or non-governmental official bodies
- Sustainability of the impact throughout time

To know if social solidarity is happening in a given context demands employing methods and indicators designed to measure improvements in people's lives, but also methods and indicators designed specifically for each policy field and/or community. Therefore, the objective is to define some common parameters meeting the demands of both small and large institutions and groups, bearing in mind the need to make the necessary adjustments in each case. de Botton et al. claim that

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there is a need to develop standardized criteria to measure solidary work before a common framework or definition can be formulated to appraise its impact.

4 Solidarity and the Financial and Refugee Crises, some legal and political considerations: Issues from the current research literature

Although it was not the task of SOLIDUS per se to examine how the financial and refugee crises impacted on solidarity in Europe, these processes have paralleled the life of SOLIDUS since its initiation. For this reason their impact cannot be ignored. In addition, much of the new writing on solidarity has focused on the implications of the refugee and financial crises for the future of solidarity in Europe.

Furthermore, those in leadership positions, at both policy-making and political levels, have frequently invoked the principle of solidarity in their discussions about social and political relations within and between nation states during the crises. It is for this reason that this section of the SOLIDUS report examines the issue of solidarity in the context of wider political and social and economic changes in Europe.

4.1. Solidarity in Context

Solidarity is an over-arching principle underpinning the framing of all the major Treaties of the European Union including the European Coal and Steel Community Treaty, in 1951, the Single European Act (1986), the Maastricht Treaty (1992) and the Treaty of Lisbon (2006). In the latter case it is framed as a value binding together both citizens and member states (Sangiovanni 2013). Solidarity is not just a generalized principle of moral guidance as it also has 'legal substantiations in EU primary law which can be made effective in court proceedings' (Kotzur 2017: 44). The fact that Chapter IV of *The Charter of Basic Rights*, approved in Nice in 2001, is titled 'Solidarity', and that it has subsequently established individual and collective rights in the labour market, and rights to different forms of social protection, indicates that solidarity has legal substance at EU level.

However, despite repeated public and legal references to solidarity, there is no single agreed understanding of the concept within Europe. As it is used to both prescribe and justify political actions, it can and is seen often as merely a rhetorical device that is designed to consolidate political opinion rather than specify meaningful action (Wilde 2007, Grimm 2017). Kellner and Wolkenstein (2013:

477) claim that it is 'a proxy concept for desirable collective action', and is as a call for engagement by politicians in very different cultural and political contexts across Europe. A prime example of this was the use of the term during both the financial and refugee crises.

During the financial crisis there were frequent calls for solidarity from EU leaders: in March 2010, the then EU Commission President, José Manuel Durão Barroso,

stated that there was ‘no stability without solidarity and no solidarity without stability’; Angela Merkel appealed for solidarity during the financial crises in the 2012; solidarity was also invoked as a desirable goal by the five presidents of key EU institutions (including the ECB, the Commission and the European Parliament) in 2015 in a report on monetary union when they called for work to ‘develop concrete mechanisms for stronger economic policy coordination, convergence and solidarity’ (Juncker et al. 2015); during the refugee crisis, the Italian Minister for European Affairs called for solidarity in an interview in February 2016 and the UK Prime Minister at the time, David Cameron, made a similar appeal in relation to taking in refugees due to the Syrian conflict in 2015; the President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker claimed that the EU had shown solidarity ‘by agreeing to relocate among our member states those [refugees] most in need of international protection’, and in the way ‘EU’s member states stood by Greece’ during their financial crisis; solidarity was also a major theme of Pope Francis’ acceptance speech for the Charlemagne Prize in May 6th 2016; in 2017 the (Centre right) Irish Prime Minister, called for solidarity with refugees in a speech on ‘Ireland the Heart of Europe’ (February 17th).

Despite all these calls by politicians for European-wide solidarity, the limitations of the fluid and flexible framing of solidarity in EU law was exposed at this time. The response to the financial crisis as expressed through the imposition of austerity on Eurozone countries (arising from the terms of bailout agreements), leading to severe personal hardship and financial burdens on citizens in the affected member states. The self-interest of EU nation states played a major role in determining policy rather than inter-state solidarity (Kotzur 2017: 44). The manner in which decisions were enacted by a largely ‘unaccountable technocracy’ of the European Central Bank (ECB), European Commission and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Eriksen 2017: 98-101) also suggested that citizens interests were secondary to financial interests.

What was significant about the calls for austerity during the financial crisis in particular is that they were laced with conditions. In May 2012, the German finance minister, Wolfgang Schäuble, cautioned that ‘European solidarity’ was ‘not a one-way street’. Now it was ‘up to Greece to abide by its obligations’. Solidarity was granted but with strings attached (and these included a radical reduction of government spending and large-scale privatisation (Hadjimichalis, 2011).

While Ahrens and Diez (2015) claim that the EU has promoted international forms of solidarity by increasing levels of inter-state solidarity, others (Auer 2014) presents a more critical perspective on the EU as an agent of inter-state solidarity; they show how three champions of European integration (Ireland, Slovakia and Germany), became more disillusioned with the EU particularly due to the management of the financial crisis and the implementation of austerity policies.

During the refugee crisis in 2015, there were few references to the moral obligations that colonization imposed on member states. Although Europe's own deeply racialised colonial history (Fanon 1963; Said 1993, Walter 1981) had played a significant role in generating the war and conflict that led to refugees fleeing to Europe, the concept of restorative justice was not applied. Instead, the refugee crisis was framed as a burden, a problem to be resolved by quotas. While Germany demonstrated transnational solidarity in 2015, giving safe harbour to 800,000 asylum seekers, there is little evidence of solidarity *between* member states in assisting asylum seekers in a fair and equitable manner (Knodt and Tews 2017; Takle 2018). The Dublin III Regulation (No. 604/2013) that assigns responsibility for asylum to the first country of entry, ensured that states that are most contiguous to peoples seeking refuge (the Mediterranean states in particular) had a disproportionate responsibility for assisting asylum seekers even though they were often least equipped to do this work. Plans to relocate asylum seekers from Greece and Italy to other EU states under the European Commission's own relocation plan have failed: only 15,000 or the 160,000 had been relocated by the end of March 2017 (*euobserver* March 27th 2017). Moreover, the Visegrad countries (Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland) were allowed to actively oppose the intake of asylum seekers, without any meaningful sanction being imposed by the EU. The rhetorical and normative appeal to solidarity is belied by practice, including within nation states such as Ireland (Lynch, Cantillon and Crean 2017). What explains this contradiction between the allegiance to principles of solidarity on the one hand, and the failure to fully implement solidarity at political and economic levels, on the other? While there are many political, legal and constitutional reasons why the EU institutions cannot enforce solidarity on member states, not least its lack of legal and political powers under the Open Method of Coordination, it is also necessary to analyse the politico- economic and ideological forces that can undermine strong forms of solidarity around and inside the 'big' politics of nation-state and EU political decision- making.

Here we analyse two of these factors, the implicit non-solidaristic values and norms governing the highly individualistic concept of the ideal citizen/person, and the inegalitarian, undemocratic and self-interested norms governing the political economy of neoliberal capitalism.

5 Challenges for Solidarity

To understand the dynamics of solidarity in Europe, it is important to recognise that it cannot operate in isolation from the prevailing ideological and political-economic institutions of its time. In twenty first century Europe, as is well documented by Beck (1992) and Giddens (1991), individualism is a powerful and prevailing norm of everyday life. In addition, it is widely recognised that neoliberal capitalism is the dominant political-economic arrangement, even if it takes different forms (Hall and Soskice, 2001), and if it varies in terms of how it is accommodated with different welfare state regimes across Europe (Esping- Andersen, 1990; Arts and Gelissan (2002). Given the cultural salience of individualism and the political-economic significance of capitalism for Europe, it is important to discuss their implications for solidarity.

5.1. Self-responsibilised Individualism and Neoliberal Capitalism

As solidarity can vary in form from the particularistic to the universalistic, from the normative to the strongly calculative, and the fact that the more universalistic form of solidarity is the most generous and unconditional, this raises important questions as to how to develop a cultural milieu and political-economic context in Europe that will endorse universalistic as opposed to particularistic forms of solidarity.

To determine the forms of solidarity that are likely to be endorsed in Europe, there is a need to analyse European ideals re citizenship that are institutionalized in law and practice. If dominant concepts of citizenship lack a full appreciation of the human relationality interdependency of the human condition, if they promoted a form of atomized citizenship (Archer 2000) then it is likely they will be antithetical to universalistic as opposed to particularistic forms of solidarity.

5.1.1. Self-responsibilised Individualism

Recent research across Europe shows that self-responsibilised individualism underpins contemporary Western modernist concepts of the citizen (Frericks 2014; Mau 2013; Van Gerven and Osssewaarde 2012): the ideal citizen is one who looks after their own welfare, health and pension. Relatedly, there is a growing belief in many European countries that solidarity should be contingent on individual responsibility (Taylor-Gooby 2011).

Despite the rise of self responsabilisation as a governing ethic, it was not originally part of the labour movement's conceptualisation of solidarity, nor even social democratic politics, yet it has become a powerful norm in relation to the

operationalisation of the welfare state exemplified in the proliferation and institutionalisation of forms of 'active' and 'responsible' citizenship (Frericks 2010; 2014; Frericks, Maier and De Graff, 2009; Van Gerven and Osssewaarde 2012): 'Only those who comply ideally with the redefined norm of self-responsibility and thus contribute to the necessary sustainability of that system may claim the (reduced) guaranteed solidarity and through that enjoy social security' (Frericks 2014: 537). Given the judgemental disposition inherent in the self-responsibilised view of citizenship, it is not surprising that there is a growing acquiescence to economic inequality, exemplified in changes in public and media discourse (Muehlebach 2012) and political party programmes since the 1990s (Mau 2015: 15); even social justice itself is increasingly made to fit the market and defined in market terms (Crouch 2013).

If Europe is to promote solidarity beyond the purely calculative and particularistic forms, then it needs to examine the ideological roots of its own conceptions of the ideal citizen, and the limitations of these. One such issue is the role that political liberalism exercises in framing of contemporary consciousness of European citizenship.

Liberalism is governed by a dualistic thinking that allows *homo economicus* (governed by self-interest) and *homo relationalis* (governed by fellow-feeling) to live comfortably within the one person (Muehlebach 2012: 20-22). Compassion and care remain defining features of the intimate personal world while calculation and instrumentalism are the governing ethics of the public sphere. When private love ethically accommodates a cold public heart, the solidarity that liberal thinking commands is calculable and restricted (ibid).

Liberalism accommodates forms of benevolence in the public sphere through charitable and philanthropic actions, but these are conditional and not given without some form of deservedness. The intellectual view of the person that de-emphasises relationality and accommodates a dualistic ethics of care/carelessness has contributed to the strong foundations on which self-responsibilised individualism has developed, one that is antipathetic to more universalistic and inclusive forms of solidarity (Lynch 2014, Crean 2018).

While most often associated with Anglophone countries, liberal political individualism has a long history in European thinking (Stjerno 2004: 132-140). Western liberal political theorists have upheld a separatist view of the person, largely ignoring the reality of human dependency and interdependency across the life course (Benhabib 1992).

Moreover, they have idealized autonomy and independence as a sign of maturity and growth, placing a premium on a human condition that is never fully realizable (England 2005). In so far as it peripheralises relationality, liberal political thinking

has glorified a concept of the person that is separated rather than connected and in this regard undermines solidarity (Lynch and Kalaitzake 2018).

5.2. Neoliberal Capitalism and Solidarity

While the calculative form of solidarity has deep intellectual roots in European intellectual thought, including religious thinking (Sterjno 2004), it also has strong connections with the dominant mode of political and economic organisation in contemporary Europe, namely neoliberal capitalism. Capitalism is premised on the legal right to ownership over productive resources, hence establishing profit maximisation as the driving force behind economic activity and one that impacts systematically on all other aspects of human political, social and cultural life. While the form of capitalism employed in Western democracies varies (Hall and Soskice 2001), one can identify a range of processes intrinsic to the workings of capitalist society that potentially undermine and/or block the development and expression of universalistic forms of solidarity. Such processes include individualised entrepreneurialism, inequality and anti-democracy. While the particular implementation of neoliberal policies has varied considerably in rigidity and degree across European member-states, it is the general tendency towards neoliberal policies within Europe that illuminates some of the fundamental tensions between capitalism and solidarity.

5.2.1. The Entrepreneurial Citizen

As neoliberalism valorises the entrepreneurial market self (Harvey 2005), it is associated with 'disassociation' from various forms of civil interaction, particularly in relation to membership of trade unions and political parties (Van Biezen & Poguntke 2014), and relatedly, in the lack of protection for workers (Heyes, Lewis, Clark 2012, Standing 2011). Security and social protection is increasingly perceived as being realised through exercising opportunism as 'individualized individuals' (Streeck 2016: 14). A feature of the growing individualisation emerging with neoliberal capitalism has been the widespread perception, among the European middle classes in particular, that negative socioeconomic outcomes are more a result of individual shortcomings and personal responsibility, rather than the effect of oppressive and/or unequal external circumstances (Mau 2015: 18-21). According to Mau, it is the majoritarian-based European middle classes that have assented to this shift of neoliberal market-based norms to the detriment of solidaristic, welfare-based modes of social cohesion. The net effect of these shifts has been to enmesh and habituate middle classes lives into norms of competitive market processes, leading to a corresponding withdrawal from collective institutions. Given their

power in the political framing of public policy, and the project of the welfare state itself, this is a very significant challenge to the development of universalistic forms of solidarity.

5.2.2. Inequality

In a strictly technical sense, economic inequality is an inherent tendency of a properly functioning capitalism. It is not unduly surprising therefore that, as in other advanced capitalist economies, there has been a consistent rise in European inequality over the past three decades (OECD 2017b). However, since the crisis of 2008, these upward trends have seen a sharp incline resulting in a European Union (EU) that is becoming more polarised both within and between member states. According to a special European Parliament report on the issue of wage and income differentials, there were increases in inequality across approximately two-thirds of the EU countries during 2006 - 2011 (European Parliament 2015). Unsurprisingly, countries that have retained solidaristic welfare protection and collective labour institutions avoided these growing disparities to a considerable degree. However, the polarisation between the very wealthy and the poorest has increased in most other member states, particularly in countries most severely hit by the economic crash (Spain, Portugal, Italy), as well as most countries within Eastern Europe. An Oxfam report (2015) calculated that almost 25 per cent of European citizens (approximately 123 million) were at risk of poverty or social exclusion, with almost 50 million living with “severe material deprivation”. These outcomes are largely due to ongoing austerity measures in conjunction with a massive economic contraction that has triggered an unprecedented jobs crisis within the EU.

Average youth unemployment rose from 15 to 25 per cent at the peak of the crisis (approximately 5.3 million people) declining to approximately 20 per cent at the end of 2015. However, these averages mask profound imbalances within the European region, with the severest levels of youth unemployment occurring in Southern member-states, in countries subjected to the most stringent austerity measures. The differential rates of youth unemployment, of 7% in Germany and 47.4% in Greece in 2016 (OECDa 2017), are merely the signifier of a much broader trend of social polarisation and deprivation within the EU (International Federation of Red Cross 2013). The absence of intergenerational solidarity is especially notable in recent decades evidenced in the rise of ‘precarity’ among the youth of Europe; in 2015, 17% of 15-29 year-olds in the EU area were NEETS, neither in employment, education nor training (OECDb 2017: 16) up from 15% in 2007, with the problem being especially acute for the children of immigrants.

Such divisions are a fertile breeding ground for social conflict and anti-solidarity developments, particularly under simultaneous conditions of growing job insecurity

and precarity (Standing 2011) that perpetuate the aforementioned feelings of mistrust, anger and resentment.

5.2.3. Anti-democracy

Capitalism limits parity of participation in democratic expression, not least through the impact of rising economic inequality which adversely impacts on the ability of those who are resource-poor to have their political voices heard and attended. As inequality rises, there is a tendency for better-off groups to consolidate political power given that they are better educated, more likely to vote, and more likely to engage in the political process. In addition, corporate capitalist bodies can and do use their considerable financial resources and skills, and their access to privileged information, to influence policy debates in ways from which most people are excluded.

At the specific level of corporate involvement in the political process, this feedback process works in discrete ways. Corporate actors can utilise significant financial resources and organisation skills to influence the political debate and policy outcomes (Johnson & Kwak 2013).

The way corporate actors exercise power in highly undemocratic ways was widely evident within Europe in the implementation of neoliberal policy choices by political leaders throughout the crisis, generally at the behest of powerful corporate entities including the European Central Bank, the European Commission and the International Monetary Fund. As EU member states lost effective access to financial market borrowing, several of them (Portugal, Ireland, Greece, Cyprus) were compelled to sign up to structural adjustment programmes in return for EU assistance funds. Soon after, Spain, Italy, France and several other Eurozone countries also voluntarily committed themselves to similar austerity measures in an effort to ward off financial market speculation. These programmes were undertaken with little democratic deliberation concerning their content or approval, and were extremely unpopular with large segments of the population, igniting frequent demonstrations and protests across Europe. This lack of respect for democratic voices has created deep-rooted disrespect for European institutions that profess to have democratic values.

The competitive individualism, growing economic inequalities and anti-democratic politics that characterises contemporary neoliberal capitalism, and the self-responsibilised individualism of contemporary European cultural thinking and practice, are co-constituent elements in creating an antipathy to forms of solidarity that are affective and universalistic as opposed to calculative and highly particularistic.

6 Conceptualisation of Solidarity: Overall Conclusions

While it is important to identify the many forms solidarity takes, the norms and values underpinning it, the conditions on which it is given and the purposes it serves, it is also important to investigate the politico-economic and ideological institutions and practices through which it is lived and mapped throughout Europe. Solidarity is either enabled or facilitated or it is undermined. It is a socio-political and cultural creation not an inevitable feature of social life.

What may promote or undermine solidarity varies by politics (for example, whether or not there are left-wing parties in government) (Taylor-Gooby 2005), by individual attributes (Mau and Burkhardt 2009), including gender (Finseraas 2009), and by the kinds of ideals and values people hold (Ciornei and Recchi 2017; Jamie-Castillo 2013). Cultural openness and having egalitarian values, in contrast to holding libertarian values, are strongly associated with both transnational and international solidarity. This is true independent of individual transnational experiences including experience of spending time or working in another country (Ciornei and Recchi 2012). In addition, there is evidence that social cohesion and solidarity is better in societies that promote values of equality and inclusion in practice (Chuang, Chuang and Yang 2013). If we promote a form of political and economic organisation that valorises competitiveness and rewards incessant consumption and acquisition, as neoliberal capitalism does, it is politically naïve to expect streams of solidarity to flow over time.

Societies that are more equal economically produce healthier people and in so doing reduce the social envy and fear that glaring economic inequalities produce (Wilkinson and Pickett 2009). Whether the object is to promote solidarity at micro, meso and macro levels, the conditions that make this possible need to be recognised, including the legal protections, the political and economic required. As Tronto (2013: 18) has observed 'without a more public conception of care it is impossible to maintain a democratic society'.

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